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ABSTRACT
Cryptocurrencies are digital assets which depend upon the use of
distributed peer-to-peer networks. The method a new peer uses
to initially join a peer-to-peer network is known as bootstrapping.
The ability to bootstrap without the use of a centralized resource is
an unresolved challenge. In this paper we survey the bootstrapping
techniques used by 74 cryptocurrencies and find that censorship-
prone methods such as DNS seeding and IP hard-coding are the
most prevalent. In response to this finding, we test two other boot-
strapping techniques less susceptible to censorship, Tor and ZMap,
to determine if they are operationally feasible alternatives more
resilient to censorship. We perform a global measurement study
of DNS query responses for each of the 92 DNS seeds discovered
across 42 countries using the distributed RIPE Atlas network. This
provides details of each cryptocurrency’s peer-to-peer network
topology and also highlights instances of DNS outages and query
manipulation impacting the bootstrapping process. Our study also
reveals that the source code of the cryptocurrencies researched
comes from only five main repositories; hence accounting for the
inheritance of legacy bootstrapping methods. Finally, we discuss
the implications of our findings and provide recommendations to
mitigate the risks exposed.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Peer-to-peer protocols; • Computer systems
organization→ Peer-to-peer architectures.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies are decentralized digital assets that do not rely
on trusted third parties for the execution of transactions between
parties. Decentralization is achieved through the use of distributed
ledger technology to provide an append-only chronicle of all trans-
actions between parties sending and receiving funds. The immutabil-
ity of transactions is achieved through a fiscally incentivized con-
sensus protocol publicly executed by peers participating in a peer-
to-peer network [51]. The decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies
provides a promise of technological amelioration to traditional pay-
ment systems [23, 27, 51, 59]. Due to the unprecedented pace of
mainstream adoption and investment into these digital assets, they
have attracted considerable scrutiny and research [19, 24, 26, 33,
34, 40, 47–50].
We present a measurement study of the techniques used to ini-
tially connect 74 different cryptocurrency peers to their relevant
distributed peer-to-peer networks. When a new peer first joins
a peer-to-peer network the action describing this initial connec-
tion is known as bootstrapping. By surveying the bootstrapping
techniques of these cryptocurrencies we are able to uncover the fol-
lowing elements about their operation: the inability to resist known
censorship techniques to prevent peer connectivity, the feasibility
of employing censorship-resistant connection techniques, details
of their peer-to-peer traffic and network infrastructures, evidence
of connection manipulation and outages impacting peer connec-
tivity, and insight into the inheritance of their source code. Based
on our findings we are able to present a number of security and
social implications of cryptocurrency bootstrapping censorship not
known from previous studies [15, 58].
We first review the bootstrapping techniques known from re-
lated studies into distributed system connectivity. We classify the
techniques into three categories based on their ability to withstand
censorship and record the advantages and disadvantages of each
method. The categories identified are censorship-prone methods,
such as Domain Name System (DNS) seeding and IP hard-coding,
censorship-mitigated methods, such as via Internet Relay Chat
(IRC) or Tor; and finally, censorship-resistant techniques such as
IPv4 scans using ZMap [14, 16, 29]. Due to the widespread use of
cryptocurrency exchanges, we also identify how these trusted third
parties fit into the peer-to-peer ecosystem in relation to bootstrap-
ping functionality.
Next, we present the results of our survey to determine the
bootstrapping techniques used by the cryptocurrencies researched.
The survey highlights that 95% of cryptocurrencies use censorship-
prone techniques of bootstrapping based on either DNS seeding or
IP hard-coding. Furthermore, 32% of cryptocurrencies use a single
DNS provider for their DNS seeds, exposing a single point of service
failure. Also, 88% of the cryptocurrencies use distinctive destination
ports, making traffic identification trivial. Based on these findings
we employ known censorship techniques to ascertain if any fall-
back techniques of bootstrapping exist on the cryptocurrencies
tested. Unfortunately, in all but one case our findings highlight
that fallback techniques were equally prone to basic censorship.
This led us to test the feasibility of bootstrapping via a censorship-
mitigated technique using Tor, which presented various results
for connectivity success. Finally, we test the ability to bootstrap
via a censorship-resistant technique using a peer initiated ZMap
IPv4 scan. Unfortunately, this technique is limited by large latency
overheads and, most importantly, not a single cryptocurrency could
connect using this method.
In the second part of our measurement study, as a consequence
of highlighting the prevalence of DNS seeding as a bootstrapping
method, we exploit this side-channel to measure details about the
cryptocurrencies peer-to-peer networks over a number of months.
Using the globally distributed network of RIPE Atlas probes, our re-
search consists of measuring the details of the DNS query responses
to the 92 DNS seeds uncovered during our bootstrapping survey.
This study is done across 46 locations in 42 different countries with
varying legal standpoints towards cryptocurrencies. Our measure-
ments uncover the topology of each cryptocurrency’s peer-to-peer
network and highlight that some cryptocurrencies use centralized
rendezvous servers as part of their connectivity strategy whilst
others unintentionally expose the IPs of their peers through the
harvesting of DNS query responses. Through this measurement
study we also determine a range of statistics regarding the number
of peer IPs seen on a per cryptocurrency and per country basis, as
well as highlighting the number of IPs active across multiple cryp-
tocurrencies. Our data also reveals how DNS seeding outages and
query response manipulations impact bootstrapping operations in
60% of the countries we investigate.
Furthermore, our research exposes that the root cause of the
prevalence of censorship-prone bootstrapping techniques is due
to the widespread practice of copying source code. Our findings
highlight that all of the cryptocurrencies researched derive from
only five parent source code repositories. Additionally, we present
a number of security implications and social implications related
to cryptocurrency censorship based on the discoveries in our study.
We conclude by providing a catalogue of tactical and strategic
recommendations to mitigate the shortcomings to cryptocurrency
bootstrapping identified by our research.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section we introduce the concept of peer-to-peer bootstrap-
ping. We then perform an analysis of related work outlining vari-
ous peer-to-peer bootstrapping techniques and classify them based
on their ability to withstand censorship. Finally, we discuss how
cryptocurrency exchanges fit into the process of peer-to-peer boot-
strapping to facilitate the trade and acquisition of cryptocurrencies.
2.1 Peer-to-Peer Bootstrapping
Themethod inwhich new peers initially join a peer-to-peer network
is commonly referred to as bootstrapping. Bootstrapping can be
succinctly described as ‘the process that a new peer who intends to
join a peer-to-peer network uses to discover contact information for
another peer in the existing network’ [29]. The ability to bootstrap
onto a peer-to-peer overlay network without the use of centralized
resources remains an outstanding challenge [42]. Any centralized
elements on a peer-to-peer network mark a point for regulation
and censorship and are ideally avoided.
However, a challenge arises when a new peer with no knowledge
of other peers wishes to join the network. They must first be able
to determine if they are the first peer on the network and, if not,
they must be able to find and connect to at least one other peer in
order to join the existing peer-to-peer network [37, 38]. We will
now review the methods of peer-to-peer bootstrapping.
2.2 Censorship-Prone Bootstrapping
In this section we review two legacy methods of peer-to-peer boot-
strapping which are heavily prone to censorship. For context, we
also provide two brief examples of peer-to-peer networks impacted
by bootstrapping censorship.
The first method to bootstrap peers onto a peer-to-peer network
is to ship the software with a preconfigured list of peer IP addresses,
known as hard-coding. Hard-coding is not ideal because the list
of peers can quickly become obsolete and it gives an adversary a
method to learn the details about the peer-to-peer network [29].
The second censorship-prone method to bootstrap onto a peer-
to-peer network is the use of DNS seeds. DNS is a hierarchical client-
server protocol which maps domain names to IP addresses [41]. For
example, a new peer querying a DNS server for the DNS seed node-
london.cryptonex.org for the Cryptonex cryptocurrency will have
an A record return a single IP or multiple IPs. The peer will then try
to connect to the IPs when bootstrapping onto the network. DNS
seeding is not ideal because DNS is a client-server based Internet
protocol which is easily censored due to its centralized nature and
mainly cleartext communication mechanisms.
Both methods have the advantage of being easy to configure
and implement. The developer need only hard-code the relevant
IPs or DNS seeds into the source code. DNS seeding also requires
the additional step of configuring the DNS zone and records. We
will also see in Section 5.2 that DNS seeding unintentionally leaks
information about peer IP addresses.
The ability to censor peer-to-peer networks based on these boot-
strapping methods can be recalled from peer-to-peer file-sharing
technologies used to exchange digitally encoded music and videos
in the late 1990s and early 2000s [30]. The two most prominent
file sharing services, Napster and The Pirate Bay (TPB), were shut-
down or censored after they were found legally accountable for
copyright infringement. Napster was shutdown in 2001 after losing
a legal battle with the Recording Industry Association of America.
The service was easily shutdown due to the use of a centralized
bootstrapping method dependent on front-end servers which al-
lowed peers to learn about the content hosted on other peers on
the network [52]. Censorship mechanisms currently used to limit
access to TPB are IP black-lists and DNS level blocking, both of
which would be highly effective at censoring IP hard-coding and
DNS seed bootstrapping methods [43].
Table 1: Comparison of Peer-to-Peer Bootstrapping Meth-
ods. Noted columns: vulnerability to censorship, ease of con-
figuration, if hard-coding is shifted to anothermethod, such
as IRC or Tor, if the other shifted method is also vulnerable
to censorship, centralized dependencies, obfuscating peer-
to-peer traffic, high latency and high bandwidth require-
ments.  = yes, # = no, × = N/A.
M
et
ho
d
C
en
so
rs
hi
p
ea
se
of
co
nf
sh
if
t h
/c
m
et
ho
d
ce
ns
.
ce
nt
ra
l d
ep
.
hi
de
s P
2P
hi
gh
la
te
nc
y
hi
gh
b.
w
.
Hard-Coding prone  × × # # # #
DNS Seeding prone  × ×  # # #
via IRC mitigated #    # # #
via Tor mitigated #   #   #
ZMap Scan resilient # # # # # #  
2.3 Censorship-Mitigated Bootstrapping
In this section we explore the related work covering two bootstrap-
ping methods which address the disadvantages of IP hard-coding
and DNS seeding.
The first method relies on the use of IRC servers [37]. IRC is a
client-server Internet protocol which allows clients to send chat
messages to other clients via distributed chat servers. This method
exploits the distributed network of IRC servers as rendezvous points
for bootstrapping. By using these servers, centralized points of
failure for initial peer connection are removed. The issue with this
method is the underlying requirement to find an IRC server to
connect to. Unfortunately, finding IRC servers also depends on
using a hard-coded list of IPs or networks, or via DNS seeds [12].
Due to this deficiency, IRC bootstrapping is not widely deployed.
The second censorship-mitigated bootstrapping technique is de-
pendent on the use of Tor hidden services. This method channels
peer-to-peer traffic via the Tor network. Tor is a volunteer-based
overlay network enabling its users to browse the Internet anony-
mously [14]. To obtain anonymity, traffic is first encrypted and then
passed through a series of at least three hops, namely an entry, mid-
dle, and exit relay. An advantage of this method is that peer-to-peer
traffic appears to be Tor traffic. Unfortunately, several countries
wishing to regulate and censor Internet access attempt to detect
and block Tor and other Virtual Private Network (VPN) traffic [39].
Censoring Tor is possible because default configurations of Tor are
easily identified based on distinct TCP destination port usage and
the characteristics of the TLS handshake between the Tor client
and entry relay [2]. Tor can also be censored at IP level because
all Tor relays can be identified by publicly available information
stored in Tor directory authorities.
Tor addresses these shortcomings by introducing pluggable trans-
ports and Tor bridges [45]. Pluggable transports utilize the stegano-
graphic concept of security by obscurity by attempting to make Tor
traffic appear as standard TLS traffic. In this way, pluggable trans-
ports provide an advantage as peer-to-peer traffic is more difficult
to identify.
Tor bridges are entry relays which do not have their IPs publicly
available on Tor directory authorities [45]. Unfortunately, default
Tor bridges also suffer from the dependence of hard-coding IPs
into the Tor browser bundle leaving them vulnerable to censorship.
However, to help circumvent censorship private Tor bridges are not
hard-coded into the Tor browser bundle. By design, the discovery of
private bridges depends on the use of manual side-channel requests,
such as email. This discovery overhead makes the use of private
bridges for peer-to-peer connectivity challenging.
One of the biggest disadvantages of utilizing Tor for peer-to-peer
bootstrapping is the bandwidth limitations and latency. This is due
to the overheads of the three-hop encrypted relay design. In the
case of bootstrapping peer-to-peer cryptocurrencies with a require-
ment to download large blockchains, the former shortcomings can
pose significant operational issues, as we shall see in Section 4.3.
Finally, it is important to note that other research observes that
Tor is not a panacea for anonymity, especially when considering
cryptocurrencies [24, 32].
2.4 Censorship-Resistant Bootstrapping
We finally discuss related work regarding the most censorship-
resistant method of bootstrapping based on IPv4 scanning.
The earliest peer-to-peer bootstrapping scan-based method was
based on geographically targeted IP scanning [29]. The idea behind
this method is the creation of a profile of the IPs already part of the
network. Once the IPs are determined, a targeted scan is formulated
based on distribution information learnt from DNS. The advantage
of this method is the focus to remove centralized elements of boot-
strapping and the need to hard-code IPs. Unfortunately, this method
still relies on the centralized DNS protocol and also assumes that
the peer-to-peer network is already established so that learning the
details of the peer IPs is possible.
However, this method importantly explores a peer-initiated scan
of the IPv4 address space in order to learn about other peers. The
computational feasibility to scan the entire IPv4 address space is
now possible due to advances in the ZMap network scanner [16].
ZMap is able to scan the entire IPv4 address space for as single TCP
port in 4.5 minutes given a 10 Gpbs Ethernet connection. The ad-
vantages of this scanning method is the removal of any centralized
dependency. However, the stated scan time of 4.5 minutes assumes
that a high bandwidth connection to the Internet is available. Also,
this technique of bootstrapping is very bandwidth intensive. It
generates 4.6 Gbps of traffic for each peer wishing to bootstrap
[16]. Furthermore, typical broadband speeds are below 10 Gbps.
Broadband speeds in Singapore average 60 Mbps, which ranks as
the world’s fastest, whilst speeds in the United States and Sweden
average 26Mbps and 46Mbps respectively. On the other end of the
scale Venezuela has an average broadband speed of only 1 Mbps
and Yemen has the slowest average speed of < 1 Mbps [35].
These bandwidth limitations in particular countries are an im-
portant point to consider based on the motivations for certain peers
to acquire cryptocurrencies. For example, peers in Venezuela may
wish to invest in cryptocurrencies due to current political uncer-
tainty causing hyperinflation to the countries’ fiat currency [36].
The security implications of cryptocurrency censorship will be
discussed further in Section 7.1.
Table 1 summarizes the different peer-to-peer bootstrapping
methods and the advantages and disadvantages of each.
2.5 Cryptocurrency Exchanges
A brief discussion of cryptocurrency exchanges provides context
regarding the pervasiveness of centralized infrastructure inher-
ent in cryptocurrency acquisition and frames how peer-to-peer
cryptocurrency bootstrapping fits into the process.
Cryptocurrency exchanges are a heavily utilized centralized
infrastructure used to acquire and trade cryptocurrencies. This
is in direct contradiction with the original peer-to-peer concepts
outlined in the original Bitcoin paper [51]. The incongruity between
the ethos of these institutions and the initial principles of Bitcoin
has been the subject of other research [19, 49, 57].
The centralized nature of exchanges makes them natural targets
for theft [57]. There is also strong evidence of cryptocurrency mar-
ket manipulation based on the use of exchanges [33]. Despite these
shortcomings, an estimated 99% of cryptocurrency trading volume
is executed through exchanges [31].
Peers can avoid the use of these exchanges by participating
directly on the peer-to-peer networks through the use of core refer-
ence client software. However, we note that, whilst cryptocurrency
exchanges typically execute trades off-chain because of the latency
associated with clearing transactions on the blockchain, they must
also eventually broadcast their transactions on-chain [28]. In or-
der for on-chain transactions to be successfully appended to the
blockchain, exchanges must also bootstrap and join as peers onto
the peer-to-peer networks using core reference client software.
Cryptocurrency exchanges have thus become a centralized proxy
mechanism for peer connectivity.
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW
In this section we present the selection process of the cryptocur-
rencies that we survey and outline our research steps.
3.1 Selection of Cryptocurrencies
Despite the volatility in the cryptocurrency market caused by new
forks of well-known currencies, and new cryptocurrencies being
introduced [5, 6], we needed to lock in a dataset for our research.
The top 100 cryptocurrencies based on USD market capitalization
was selected on February 28, 2018 [9]. These cryptocurrencies can
be classified into four categories: mineable coins, non-mineable
coins, mineable tokens and non-mineable tokens, noted in Table 5
in Appendix B.
The difference between coins and tokens is that coins have their
own native blockchains, and tokens are built using a template on an
existing blockchain [60]. For tokens, the core elements of peer-to-
peer connectivity, including bootstrapping, depend on the method
used by the underlying coin. Therefore, studying the bootstrapping
behaviour of tokens is captured by researching the underlying coin.
Mineable and non-mineable cryptocurrencies are differentiated
by their methods of acquisition. Non-mineable cryptocurrencies
are generally acquired through centralized exchanges. Conversely,
prior to the creation of exchanges, mineable cryptocurrencies were
acquired either through direct peer-to-peer transfer or through
the process of mining. The process of mining is described in the
original Bitcoin paper [51].
Figure 1 shows the selected cryptocurrencies classified into four
categories, 25 of these are non-mineable coins, 25 are mineable
Ethereum 43%
Neo 1 %
Non-Mineable 25%
Omni 2%
Mineable 25%
Transitioning 4%
Figure 1: Breakdown of the Top 100 Cryptocurrencies
coins, and 50 are tokens. Non-mineable coins were excluded from
our study as they depend on centralized exchanges for acquisition.
That is, in relation to this study, they do not have a bootstrapping
mechanism associated with peer-to-peer networking.
The 50 tokens are represented by the green hues, namely Omni,
Neo, Ethereum and Transitioning tokens. The underlying coin for
the Omni tokens is Bitcoin, whilst the underlying coins for the
Ethereum and Transitioning tokens is the Ethereum coin. Ethereum
tokens are also commonly referred to as ERC20 tokens. The four
‘Transitioning’ tokens were ERC20 tokens in the midst of migrating
to their own native blockchains during our research period. Finally,
the Neo token resides on an underlying coin called Gas. Gas is a
non-mineable coin; therefore, the Neo token and the Gas coin were
both excluded from our research for the reasons noted previously.
In summary, our research consisted of measuring the bootstrap-
ping methods of the 25 mineable coins, thus including the 43 ERC20,
four Transitioning and two Omni tokens in our study.
3.2 Summary of Research Steps
A first element of our research is to survey the bootstrapping meth-
ods of 25 mineable coins and their 49 underlying tokens, noted in
Section 3.1. The survey is completed by installing the core-reference
client of each mineable coin onto a virtual machine and recording
its connectivity behaviour during the bootstrapping process. We
then cross-reference the behaviour against the open source code
repositories of each coin. We then iteratively test basic censorship
mechanisms, such as IP blacklisting and DNS sinkholing in order
to determine fallback methods of bootstrapping.
Upon source code inspection, we uncover that several coins
have configurable means to connect via Tor. Therefore, we test and
record the efficacy of this bootstrapping technique. Furthermore,
we test a censorship-resistant method of bootstrapping by using
ZMap to scan for potential peers and record the results.
We then perform a global measurement study over 46 geograph-
ically distributed RIPE Atlas probes in 42 countries to query the 92
DNS seeds discovered in our bootstrapping survey. RIPE Atlas is
a geographically spread, volunteer-based network of probes used
to measure Internet metrics such as network latency, traceroute
paths, and DNS, SSL/TLS, HTTP and NTP responses [10].
Finally, as our research dictates the source code survey of nu-
merous cryptocurrencies, we uncover the root cause of inheritance
of legacy bootstrapping methods by mapping the software fork
select coins for
research Sec. 3.1
categorize
cryptocurrencies 3.1
review related
literature Sec.2
mineable
non-mineable
virtual machine
test Sec. 4
review source
code Sec. 4
survey
bootstrap Sec. 4
censorship-
mitigated
censorship-proneTor hard-coded DNS
censorship-
resistant
test Tor
bootstrap
Sec. 4.3
map software
forks 6
test censorship
Sec. 4
RIPE Atlas
study Sec. 5
test ZMap
bootstrap
Sec. 4.4
task: general itemtask: testtask: categorizelegend:
Figure 2: Research Methodology Flow Chart
lineage of the cryptocurrencies studied. In Figure 2 we outline the
flow of our research steps and note the corresponding sections.
4 SURVEY OF CRYPTOCURRENCY
BOOTSTRAPPING METHODS
This section presents the survey of bootstrapping methods used
on the 25 mineable coins and the 49 underlying tokens selected in
Section 3.1. The highlight of the survey indicates that 95% of the
cryptocurrencies tested use only censorship-prone bootstrapping
methods. We also test and record the challenges of channelling
peer-to-peer bootstrapping traffic via Tor and test the feasibility of
bootstrapping using ZMap IPv4 scanning.
4.1 Determining Bootstrapping Methods
The first task is to install the core-reference client software on
25 virtual machines and determine the bootstrapping behaviour
through the use of network analysis tools and application debug
logs. Next, we cross-reference the identified behaviour with the
open source code of each cryptocurrency. As we expect, in all
cases the bootstrapping connection behaviour reflects what is in
the source code. We determine that three main options of peer-
to-peer bootstrapping are DNS seeding, hard-coding IP seeds, and
bootstrapping via Tor.
Table 2 records each coins bootstrapping method. Also, in Ap-
pendix B, the tooling used to discover the bootstrapping methods
is recorded in Table 4 and the details of the source code for boot-
strapping functionality can be found in Table 6.
DNS seeding is the most common bootstrapping method iden-
tified; therefore, we also review the DNS provider diversity for
the 92 DNS seeds discovered, which are noted in Table 7 in Ap-
pendix B. It is recommended that DNS name services are sourced
from redundant providers to mitigate denial of service risks [20].
However, nearly one third of the coins, namely Monero, Dogecoin,
Electroneum, Zclassic, Syscoin, Cryptonex, Monacoin, and Zcoin
use only a single DNS provider.
Our survey allows us to determine the characteristics of cryp-
tocurrency peer-to-peer traffic. In Section 2.3 we noted that coun-
tries wishing to regulate and censor Internet access attempt to block
Tor traffic. Recall that Tor traffic can be identified based on desti-
nation TCP port usage, and IP connectivity to publicly published
relays. Unfortunately, the same characteristics impact the ability to
regulate and censor peer-to-peer cryptocurrency traffic.
95% of the cryptocurrencies evaluated in this survey use distinct
TCP and UDP destination ports, making the traffic easy to identify.
In Table 6 in Appendix B we record the destination ports of all the
cryptocurrencies surveyed. The ports on which cryptocurrencies
operate are easily learned directly from reviewing the open source
code or from using standard network packet analysis tools. Methods
to mitigate the trivial identification of cryptocurrency peer-to-peer
traffic are discussed in Section 8.2.
4.2 Identifying Bootstrapping Resilience
Through Basic Censorship Testing
We now proceed to test the resilience of each cryptocurrency’s
bootstrapping ability by iteratively applying different censorship
methods. To emulate DNS censorship, we populate the virtual ma-
chines local hosts file with the static mapping of all domain names
noted in Table 7 in Appendix B and point them to the loopback IP
address. The latter method emulates a technique known as DNS
sinkholing [25]. Censorship of hard-coded seeds is achieved by IP
blocking using a software firewall.
Our tests reveal that some cryptocurrencies have fallback meth-
ods of bootstrapping when the primary method is censored. We
identify the fallback bootstrapping methods by first implementing
DNS sinkholing or IP blocking and subsequently reviewing the
application connection logs, and network packet traffic analyser
outputs. Finally, we confirm the fallback bootstrapping method by
cross-referencing the relevant source code.
Seven coins are unable to bootstrap based on DNS censorship
alone. These coins are Bitcoin Gold, Dogecoin, Zclassic, Syscoin,
Cryptonex, Zcoin, and Vertcoin. The first four listed coins are un-
able to bootstrap because no secondary option of bootstrapping
exists–such as hard-coded seeds. For Zclassic, there is a configu-
ration option for a fallback bootstrap mechanism via hard-coded
seeds, but no values exist. In the case of Zcoin, and Vertcoin, con-
nection attempts are seen to hard-coded IPs which are verified in
the source code. However, no successful connections are completed
after a period of 24 hours.
Five coins are unable to bootstrap based on IP censorship alone.
These coins are Ethereum, which also covers 47 underlying tokens,
Ethereum Classic, Siacoin, and Bitcore. Therefore, if we consider
the underlying tokens, 80% of the cryptocurrencies tested do not
have resilient bootstrapping methods configured. Our tests reveal
that if DNS censorship is combined with IP censorship, that only
Verge is able to bootstrap by default through the use of Tor.
Furthermore, Syscoin is unable to reconnect to the peer-to-peer
network when DNS seed censorship is present. DNS censorship
should have limited success for peer reconnection because in typical
operation previously connected peers should be locally cached
[34]. This indicates a persistent dependency on DNS for ongoing
connectivity requirements, rather than limiting the dependency on
this censorship-prone resource for bootstrapping alone.
Table 2 summarizes the results of this section and the fallback
methods of bootstrapping that we discovered.
4.3 Results of Tor Bootstrapping
Reviewing the source code for 25 cryptocurrencies uncovers the
option to support connectivity through a proxy server for 20 of
the coins. Therefore, we test the ability to bootstrap via Tor. This
allows us to explore the rate of success when bootstrapping through
a censorship-mitigated method. Verge is not included in testing
because it uses Tor by default.
We perform our test by installing the Tor expert bundle or tor-
socks on the Windows or Ubuntu virtual machines and configure
the local SOCKS proxy to channel the cryptocurrency peer-to-peer
traffic. We also ensure the local peer caches are cleared to ensure a
true bootstrapping experience.
Only 13 coins are able to successfully bootstrap, five are unsuc-
cessful, and two bootstrap but have various issues. The five coins
unable to bootstrap are Bitcoin Gold, Zcash, Bytecoin, Dogecoin,
and Electroneum. The two coins which bootstrap but have issues are
Bitcoin Cash and Monero. For Bitcoin Cash finding other peers to
connect to for bootstrapping is successful. However, after 24 hours
of operation the estimated time to download the full blockchain
through Tor is quoted as one year and 27weeks, making this method
of connectivity infeasible in practice. Monero is able to proxy some
of its peer-to-peer traffic via Tor, but the UDP based DNS queries
leak outside of the SOCKS proxy and setting the DNS_PUBLIC=tcp
option results in several errors with connectivity. The README.md
on the ‘Using Tor’ section of Monero, Electroneum, and Bytecoin
explicitly indicate that these coins are not meant to integrate with
Tor [4, 7]. Therefore, any issues experienced are within the expec-
tations set by their core developers. We discuss the reasons for this
similarity in Section 6.
Although bootstrapping via Tor can mitigate the risk of censor-
ship, it may not provide the levels of anonymity desired [24, 32].
Also, proxied connections must accept latency and performance
penalties limiting the ability to download large blockchains in a
timely manner. Furthermore, in a highly regulated environment,
extra caution is required to avoid the censorship of Tor itself. This
includes the use of pluggable transports to obscure the character of
Tor traffic and the manual collection of private bridge IP addresses.
Table 2: CryptocurrencyBootstrapMethods andConnection
Results. TorOption =Tor connectivity configurable, TorOut-
come = connection results of Tor bootstrap, DNS Censor
= DNS censorship able to prevent bootstrap, DNS Single =
DNS seeds use diverse providers, Config Issues = other issues,
ZMap Time = time in mm:ss to discover eight peers, ZMap
Bootstrap = bootstrap success,  = yes, # = no, × = N/A,  =
successful bootstrap, = bootstrap has issues, = bootstrap
not successful after 24h, ⋄ = GUI option for Tor, †= DNS seed
configured, yet NXDOMAIN returned, ‡= hard-coding mis-
configuration, (#) = number of underlying tokens.
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Bitcoin (2) BTC DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
  # # # 7:58 #
Ethereum (47) ETH Hard-Coded # × × × # × ×
Bitcoin Cash BCH DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
  # # # 7:58 #
Litecoin LTC DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
  # # # 23:43 #
Dash DASH DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
  # # # 26:32 #
Monero XMR DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
  #  † 18:43 #
Eth. Classic ETC Hard-Coded # × × × # 15:54 #
Bitcoin Gold BTG DNS Seed    # # 16:08 #
Zcash ZEC DNS Seed   # # # 32:15 #
Bytecoin BCN Hard-Coded   × × # 29:24 #
Verge XVG Tor   × × # × ×
Dogecoin DOGE DNS Seed     # 29:29 #
Siacoin SC Hard-Coded # × × × # 11:42 #
Electroneum ETN DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
  #  † 10:59 #
HShare HSR DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
  # # † 18:27 #
Zclassic ZCL DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
    ‡ 16:41 #
Komodo KMD DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
  # # # 6:50 #
Syscoin SYS DNS Seed     # 6:45 #
Digibyte DGB DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
  # # # 15:45 #
Cryptonex CNX DNS Seed # ×   # 7:16 #
Monacoin MONA DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
  #  # 14:58 #
Bitcore BTX Hard-Coded   × × # 11:20 #
Zcoin XZC DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
 ⋄    # 28:46 #
Vertcoin VTC DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
   # # 7:58 #
SmartCash SMRT DNS Seed
Hard-Coded
  # # # 13:32 #
The results in this section are summarized in Table 2. Support cases
with the core development teams, and our labs Internet Speed are
noted in Appendix A.
4.4 Results of ZMap Bootstrapping
In the previous sections we have surveyed the censorship-prone
methods of bootstrapping present in the majority of cryptocurren-
cies researched, and we have also tested their resilience to basic
censorship to determine fallback methods of bootstrapping. We
also tested the ability to bootstrap through a censorship-mitigated
method via Tor. In this section we test the feasibility of bootstrap-
ping through a censorship-resistant method by using scanning the
IPv4 address space using ZMap. The majority of core reference
software peers limit their connections to eight other peers. There-
fore, on our ZMap scanning parameter we configure the scan to
halt as soon as eight peers with the relevant destination TCP ports
have been discovered. We first record the amount of time it takes to
discover the peers using ZMap, then we test the ability to bootstrap
using the discovered peer IPs.
Our results show that the mean time to discover eight peers was
16min 29sec. Surprisingly, none of the cryptocurrencies could boot-
strap successfully using this method. As this result was unexpected,
we attempted to run a full IPv4 scan on port tcp/8333 (the port
used by Bitcoin). The scan took just under four hours to complete
and only discovered 241 IPs, none of which allowed Bitcoin to suc-
cessfully bootstrap. Also, Siacoin has a list of 101 hard-coded seeds
configured in the source code, therefore we ran an exhaustive scan
to see if any of these seeds were discovered. Regrettably, although
221 IPs were found listening on Siacoins’ destination TCP port (with
a total scan time exceeding five hours), none of these IPs coincided
with the hard-coded seeds. Consequently, bootstrapping was not
successful using any of the discovered IPs. Because none of the
cryptocurrencies could bootstrap using eight discovered IPs, we
also ran a series of exhaustive scans and noted scan times would
typically take between four to five hours to complete, making this
method infeasible in practise. The scan times would also be im-
pacted by the variance in geographical network latency, noted in
Table 3.
We could surmise that one of the challenges impacting this
method of bootstrapping was the bandwidth requirements to run
a full scan in a timely manner. Furthermore, we noted an issue
could arise when destination port numbers were commonly used
by other services. For example, Bytecoin uses port tcp/8080, a com-
monly used port for proxy and web services. Furthermore, Vertcoin,
Bitcoin Cash, and Bitcoin all use the same destination port, so
finding peers unique to the particular peer-to-peer network would
be fraught with issues. Finally, Ethereum uses dynamic ports for
peer connectivity, therefore, this method of peer discovery was not
compatible with this coin.
Despite the major advantage that this method of bootstrapping
requires no centralized resources, our results show that this is not a
feasible method of bootstrapping due to the nil success rate, varying
discovery times, and the fact that the peer-to-peer traffic is still
identifiable by the destination port of its operation. Results for this
section can be seen on Table 2.
5 GLOBAL RIPE ATLAS STUDY ON DNS SEEDS
After determining the bootstrapping methods of 25 coins and 49
underlying tokens, we now turn our investigation to the measure-
ments obtained from our global RIPE Atlas DNS seed bootstrapping
Figure 3: RIPE Atlas Probe Locations. The colours represent
the latency associated with each DNS query response. red =
high, amber = medium, green = low. The latency times are
summarized in Table 3 under the column labelled Latency.
study. We first provide statistics and insights about the distribution
of IP addresses returned from the DNS query responses. Then, we
expose several negative results impacting DNS seed bootstrapping,
such as outages and query response manipulation.
5.1 Detailed Research Methodology of Study
We begin by elaborating on the research steps outlined in Section 3
which are specific to this element of our study.
5.1.1 RIPE Atlas Probe Selection. To begin our RIPE Atlas study,
we need to select the RIPE Atlas probes that will be used to perform
the DNS queries for our research. Based on a data collection interval
of two months, we choose 46 RIPE Atlas probes from 42 countries
across Asia Pacific, Europe Middle East Africa, North America, and
South America.
In several countries trading and acquiring cryptocurrencies is
illegal or is under legal scrutiny [8, 55]. Therefore, where possible,
we have selected RIPE Atlas probes from these countries, with
the intent of measuring possible DNS response manipulation. A
summary of the countries selected, and their legal standpoints
towards cryptocurrencies can be seen in Table 3. A longitudinal
view of each RIPE Atlas probe in our study can be seen in Figure 3.
5.1.2 DNS Seed Enumeration and Selection. Our next step is to
enumerate all the DNS seeds used by the cryptocurrencies. These
are noted in the source code and verified on the virtual machines,
outlined in Section 4. All 92 DNS seeds can be seen in Table 7 in
Appendix B. Only seeds with a ‘Yes’ or ‘Partial’ result column R:0
(indicating Return Code 0), of Table 7, are selected for analysis
because they are the only responsive seeds.
DNS query responses include Return Codes which indicate the
status of the response. The Return Codes seen in the RIPE Atlas
study are 0–NOERROR, indicating that the query is successfully
completed, 2–SERVFAIL indicating that a server failure has oc-
curred to the DNS query, and 3–NXDOMAIN indicating that the
requested domain name does not exist.
Return Code manipulation is a typical DNS censorship technique
[18, 54]. For example, if cryptotest1.io was configured with an A
record, the correct query response would include Return Code 0
along with the correct the IP address. However, in a censored envi-
ronment, the query response may be manipulated to Return Code
3, thus withholding the IP address from the client and ultimately
preventing access to the resource. In Section 5.3.1 we outline an
example of Return Code manipulation witnessed in our study.
5.1.3 Data Collection Intervals. For the majority of DNS seeds, the
RIPE Atlas data collection was conducted between May 6–July 6,
2018. From May 6–June 2, each seed was queried on each probe
every 24 hours. We were able to increase the interval to every
six hours from June 3–July 6 because we accrued more RIPE Atlas
credits to support an increased polling interval for ourmeasurement
study.
Due to initial struggles with the verification of the DNS seed
bootstrapping process for the coins HShare, Komodo, Zcash and
Zclassic, the DNS seeds for these coins were tested between August
12–September 23. The polling interval for these coins was every
6 hours. Instead of excluding these coins from our study, due to
issues with source code verification, we opted to perform the same
manner of RIPE Atlas data collection on these coins, albeit during
a different time period.
5.1.4 Data Processing Steps. The raw data from the DNS queries
made from the RIPE Atlas probes is output into a JSON format. We
extract the fields relevant to our study using a Python script and
output this data into a CSV which is then further processed into an
SQL script with the appropriate INSERT statements to input into a
MySQL relational database. The data queried from MySQL forms
the basis of our measurement study.
5.2 DNS Seed Measurement Results
In this section we present the main results of our global measure-
ment study into DNS seeds used for cryptocurrency bootstrapping.
We will capture the statistics surveyed for each cryptocurrency,
highlight peers active across multiple coins, and reveal the variance
in distinct IPs recorded in countries with differing legal standpoints
towards these digital assets.
5.2.1 IP Statistics Per Cryptocurrency. We begin our data analysis
by capturing the statistics regarding the number of IP addresses
returned for each cryptocurrency. In Figure 4 we record the number
of distinct IPs and total number of IPs of the cryptocurrencies that
we research. To understand the difference between the set of distinct
and total IPs for each cryptocurrency we provide the following
example.
Example 5.1. This example uses private IPs, therefore no infor-
mation about real peers is disclosed.
Assume two DNS queries are made for the DNS seed example-
seed.mycryptocurrency.org. The first query response returns the set
of IPs S1 = {10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2, 10.0.0.3, 10.0.0.4}, and the second
query response returns the set of IPs S2 = {10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.5}. The
number of total IPs from the two queries is simply |S1 | + |S2 | =
4 + 2 = 6. The number of distinct IPs from the two queries is
|S1 ∪ S2 | = |{10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2, 10.0.0.3, 10.0.0.4, 10.0.0.5}| = 5.
Our measurement data reveals that the following coins return
less than 26 distinct IPs: Monacoin (18), Cryptonex (21), Zcoin (24),
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Figure 4: Number of Total and Distinct IPs from RIPE Atlas
DNS Seed Query Responses. The y–axis is logarithmic.
and Zclassic (25). Conversely, the remaining coins with the high-
est number of distinct IP addresses returned are: Bitcoin (44077),
Litecoin (7393), Dash (5489), Dogecoin (2812), Bitcoin Cash (2512),
Syscoin (1280), Vertcoin (967), Zcash (619), Bitcoin Gold (331), Di-
gibyte (295), Komodo (86), and SmartCash (67).
For the coins returning less than 26 distinct IPs, the bootstrapping
process relies on a static set of servers for connection to the peer-
to-peer network. That is, the DNS query responses reveal the IPs
of rendezvous servers, rather than the IPs of other peers on the
network. Unfortunately, this bootstrapping method reflects the
legacy method of how Napster peers connected to the peer-to-peer
network, noted in Section 2.2.
The coins returning less than 26 distinct IPs have a disadvantage
in terms of being able to withstand basic censorship. However, they
inadvertently prevent side-channel information leakage. In contrast,
consider coins returning a large set of dynamically changing IPs
in the DNS query responses. A clear side-channel is exposed to
harvest information about the IPs of peers. This information can
be collected without the need to install any core reference client
software. That is, DNS query responses reveal the IPs of peers on
the network, which is an unintended consequence of DNS seeding.
5.2.2 Peers Active Across Two or More Cryptocurrencies. Our mea-
surement study reveals that 5.2% of the distinct IPs identified are
active across two or more cryptocurrencies. We calculate this result
as follows: Let C be the set of cryptocurrencies which use DNS
seeding as a bootstrap method, where:
C = {BTC,BTH, LTC,DASH, XMR,BTG,ZEC,DOGE, ETN,HSR,
ZCL,KMD, SYS,DGB,CNX,MONA, XZC,VTC, SMRT}. LetDi be
the set of distinct IPs returned for each i ∈ C. Our data shows that:∑
i ∈C
|Di | = |DBTC | + |DBTH | + |DLTC | + . . . + |DSMRT | = 66016
Also, if we let I represent the set of distinct IPs in our entire data
set, we find that |I | = 62732. This reveals that:∑
i ∈C
|Di | − |I| = 3284
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Figure 5: Distinct IP Address Count Statistics of Countries
Grouped by Cryptocurrency Legal Status.
That is, 3284 out of the 62732 peers measured are active across two
or more cryptocurrencies. IPs active across multiple cryptocurren-
cies could be individual peers with diversified investments. How-
ever, they could be the IPs of cryptocurrency exchanges, which act
as a proxy for numerous peers. Identifying and censoring the IPs
used by exchanges would have a profound impact to the trade and
acquisition of these digital assets for numerous peers.
5.2.3 IP Statistics by Legal Status. The final statistic we capture
is the number of distinct IP addresses seen in countries grouped
by their legal status towards cryptocurrencies, noted in Table 3. In
Figure 5 we see that lower distinct IP counts tend to be in countries
where cryptocurrencies are illegal or are under legal scrutiny, and
that the higher IP counts belong to countries where cryptocurrency
ownership is fully legal.
5.3 DNS Manipulation
In this section we present results regarding evidence of manipu-
lation of the cryptocurrency bootstrapping process based on the
reliance on DNS seeding. To maintain privacy, we only disclose the
AS number containing the peer IPs identified in our study.
5.3.1 NXDOMAIN Manipulation. In our study we find that three
probes inject manipulated results for DNS query responses on Non-
Existent Domains. All other probes return NXDOMAIN, but these
probes return NOERROR. The ability to manipulate the return
code in a DNS query response and present fabricated peer IPs
reflects the ability to modify the bootstrapping process. Presenting
false peer IPs could isolate the peer from the peer-to-peer network.
Worse, manipulated IPs could resolve to a reconnaissance host
which records connection attempts to the cryptocurrency peer-to-
peer network [44]. This is concerning for peers in countries where
cryptocurrencies are illegal, as noted in Table 3.
The behaviour of manipulating DNS query responses in China
is well documented [18, 54]. However, we surprisingly record this
behaviour in Brazil and in the USA. All the DNS seeds for Mon-
ero return NXDOMAIN on all probes, except for China–which is
expected. Interestingly, we also see return code manipulation on
a probe in Yorkton Heights, USA. The latter probe returns an IP
in AS45028 for seeds.moneroseeds.ae.org. The IP is reachable, but
it suspiciously does not accept connections to TCP ports 18080 or
28080 on which Monero operates. The China probe returns an IP in
AS4837, which is unreachable. It also returns the same IPwhen other
probes report NXDOMAIN for DNS seeds: dnsseed.dashpay.io,
node-singapore.cryptonex.org, and seeds.electroneum.com. The
Yorkton Heights probe also exhibits the same manipulated NX-
DOMAIN behaviour on seed1.smartcash.org, seed2.smartcash.org,
node-singapore.cryptonex.org, and seeds.electroneum.com. Finally,
on the seed singapore.cryptonex.org we see the Brazil host also
returning a false NOERROR. Results are summarized in Table 3.
5.3.2 TTL Manipulation. In this section we identify a commonly
manipulated parameter in DNS query responses called the Time
to Live (TTL) value. We show examples of this manipulation cap-
tured in our study and analyse how this manipulation impacts
cryptocurrency bootstrapping behaviour.
TTL values tell DNS servers how long to cache query responses
in order to reduce network traffic and improve performance. The
prevalence of TTL manipulation globally has been noted to occur
in 20% of DNS query responses [54]. The main intention behind
TTL manipulation is generally motivated by performance consider-
ations.
Example 5.2. This example uses a private IP, ensuring no infor-
mation about real resources is revealed. Assume a website ttlexam-
ple.earth has a single A record referencing IP address 10.0.0.50 with
a TTL of 3600s. To reduce DNS query traffic an ISP may manipu-
late the TTL from 3600s to 86400s. By manipulating the TTL, the
IP address for this website is cached for 23 hours longer than the
authentic parameter. As a result, DNS query traffic is minimized
for this record over a 24-hour period.
For websites returning a static set of IP addresses, TTL manipu-
lation decreases traffic load and increases performance. However,
although well intended, TTL manipulation may not be suitable for
domains that host dynamic IP content, such as the coins we see in
Section 5.2, which return peer IP addresses. Considering the churn
rate associated with peer-to-peer networks [42], manipulating TTL
values to high values could also lead to the return of stale peer
IPs which are no longer active on the network, thereby adversely
impacting the bootstrapping process.
During the period of our research, the data reveals that TTL
manipulation would have caused peer bootstrapping behaviour
changes for: Dogecoin, Bitcoin, Vertcoin, and Bitcoin Gold. For
Dogecoin the primary DNS seed seed.multidoge.org returns SERV-
FAIL thereby returning no peer IP addresses on 93% of our selected
probes between June 2–16. Yet on probes in El Salvador, Honduras
and Ohio, USA, we still see NOERROR responses between June
2–4 because of overwritten TTL values. Luckily, the Dogecoin sec-
ondary seed seed2.multidoge.org remains responsive during this
period otherwise bootstrapping would have failed because Doge-
coin does not have a diverse bootstrapping mechanism configured.
For Bitcoin, the DNS seed dnsseed.bitcoin.dashjr.org returns a
SERVFAIL for all probes during the May 11–June 2, 2018 period.
However due to TTL manipulation, the probes in China, El Sal-
vador, Honduras, and Panama continue to return results between
May 11–12, and Australia continues to return results between May
11–24. For Bitcoin, outage on this seed dnsseed.bitcoin.dashjr.org
is not a major issue impacting bootstrapping behaviour because all
other seeds were returning results during this period. Also, Bitcoin
provides a large list of hard-coded IP addresses for bootstrapping
as a fallback method, as noted on Table 2.
Table 3: Details of RIPE Atlas Probes. In this table we record
the country, and region of each probe, the associated legal
status towards cryptocurrencies for the country, the num-
ber of probes chosen in each country and the latency of the
DNS query responses inms.We also highlight if the probe(s)
in that country experienced issues related to common DNS
manipulation techniques and other DNS related issues. Ab-
breviations: NXD = NXDOMAINmanipulation present, TTL
= TTL manipulation present, Goog. = Google DNS issues
present,  = yes, # = no, † = average, ‡= probe went offline
June 28, 2018.
Country Region Status
# of
probes
Latency
< x ms
NXD TTL Goog.
Algeria EMEA illegal 1 50 #  #
Argentina SAMER legal 1 30 #  #
Australia APAC legal 1 20 #  #
Bangladesh APAC illegal 1 100 #  #
Bolivia SAMER illegal 1 100 # # #
Brazil SAMER legal 1 200  # #
Cambodia APAC scrutiny 1 800 # #  
Canada NAMER legal 2 60† # #  
Chile SAMER legal 1 40 # # #
China APAC scrutiny 1 10   #
Columbia SAMER legal 1 200 #  #
Ecuador SAMER illegal 1 200 # #  
El Salvador SAMER legal 1 50 #  #
Germany EMEA legal 1 40 # #  
Honduras SAMER legal 1 100 #  #
India APAC scrutiny 1 100 # # #
Indonesia APAC scrutiny 1 30 # # #
Iran EMEA illegal 1 100 # # #
Israel EMEA legal 1 200 # #  
Japan APAC legal 1 10 # # #
Kyrgyzstan APAC legal 1 200 # #  
Macedonia EMEA illegal 1 100 #  #
Mexico NAMER legal 1 100 # # #
Nepal ‡ APAC illegal 1 100 # # #
New Zealand APAC legal 1 20 # # #
Nicaragua SAMER legal 1 100 # #  
Nigeria EMEA scrutiny 1 100 # # #
Pakistan APAC scrutiny 1 200 # #  
Panama SAMER legal 1 200 #   
Peru SAMER legal 1 100 # #  
Poland EMEA legal 1 20 # # #
Puerto Rico SAMER legal 1 100 # # #
Russia EMEA scrutiny 1 40 # # #
Saudi Arabia EMEA legal 1 100 # # #
South Korea APAC legal 1 200 #  #
Tanzania EMEA legal 1 10 # #  
Thailand APAC scrutiny 1 40 # # #
Turkey EMEA scrutiny 1 200 # #  
United Kingdom EMEA legal 1 30 # # #
Uruguay SAMER legal 1 30 #  #
USA NAMER legal 4 50†    
Vietnam APAC scrutiny 1 100 # #  
We also see the seed dnsseed.pknight.ca for Vertcoin unrespon-
sive between July 4–6. Yet, due to TTL manipulation we continue
to see DNS responses returning peer IP addresses in China, El Sal-
vador, Honduras and Panama. At this time Vertcoin was also in a
precarious position. It only had one other seed responsive during
this period and, as noted in Section 4, the hard-coded IP addresses in
Vertcoin’s secondary bootstrapping configuration are unreachable.
Finally, an outage in Bitcoin Gold DNS seeds, which we cover in
more detail in Section 5.4, highlights TTL manipulation in Algeria,
Argentina, Bangladesh, China, Columbia, El Salvador, Honduras,
Macedonia, South Korea, Uruguay and the USA. In all of these cases,
assuming the peer IPs were active, TTL manipulation provided the
increased availability of DNS seeds that would have otherwise
been unavailable from the DNS servers used by the probes in the
countries noted.
However, the ability to manipulate TTL values on cryptocur-
rency DNS seeds could also provide negative consequences. Manip-
ulating TTL values too high could isolate a bootstrapping peer from
the network if all the returned IP addresses belonged to peers no
longer active on the network. For example, measurement studies of
Bitcoin nodes indicate that the majority of IP addresses are active
less than five days [26]. Therefore, for Bitcoin, manipulating a TTL
to a value that exceeds five days could return stale peer IPs and
interrupt the bootstrapping process. Excessive TTL manipulation
would have the most profound impact on the coins in Table 2 which
do not have a fallback bootstrapping method. The results of this
section are summarized in Table 3.
5.4 Recorded Outages and Issues
In this section we review the DNS seed outages impacting cryp-
tocurrency bootstrapping during our study. We identify an outage
impacting Bitcoin Gold and highlight issues specific to Google DNS
servers across 14 countries impacting a total of six cryptocurrencies.
5.4.1 Bitcoin Gold Outage. Our measurement study reveals a near
miss outage for bootstrapping on Bitcoin Gold between June 22–23,
2018. Bitcoin Gold has two responsive seeds: dnsseed.btcgpu.org
and dnsseed.bitcoingold.org. We see that for IPv6 responses, both
seeds return SERVFAIL codes. Also for IPv4 responses, the former
seed also returns SERVFAIL codes for all probes between 19:00UTC
June 22 and 18:00UTC June 23. During this time period a single
IPv4 address in AS22612 is returned on the dnsseed.bitcoingold.org
seed. Typically, each query response for this seed returns 29 peer
IPs. However, during this period, bootstrapping onto the Bitcoin
Gold depends on a single IP address. This situation is especially
precarious for Bitcoin Gold, as Table 2 indicates DNS seeding is the
only bootstrapping option configured for this coin.
5.4.2 Google DNS Issues. On June 30, 2018 we also find that Google
DNS servers across 14 countries–noted on Table 3–return no IPv4
addresses across the DNS seeds of six cryptocurrencies: Zcoin,
Monacoin, Litecoin, Digibyte, Dash, and Cryptonex. In all cases, a
NOERROR response code is provided, but no peer IPs are returned.
The issue appears to relate to seeds in the top-level domains .io and
.org. Furthermore, for Bitcoin Gold, during the entire data collection
interval from May 6–July 6, the exact issue is seen in the same 14
countries using Google DNS. IPv6 records are returned during this
time (with the exception of the outage time noted in Section 5.4).
Therefore, Bitcoin Gold peers in these regions using Google DNS
with limited IPv6 functionality would struggle to bootstrap under
these conditions.
This section has highlighted several negative consequences of
using DNS seed bootstrapping for cryptocurrencies. By depending
on DNS, we see that bootstrapping is subject to connection manip-
ulation and outages in 60% of the countries that we investigate. The
outages recorded relate to operational issues on individual coins
and the use of specific DNS providers.
6 UNCOVERING BOOTSTRAPPING
INHERITANCE
During our research we concurrently review the source code of
25 cryptocurrency coins and note considerable similarities in the
style and syntax of the code. Based on this finding, we complete
an analysis of the code repositories to map the software lineage
(known as a software forks) of each cryptocurrency researched.
This uncovers a chain of inheritance of each source code repository
to only five main code bases.
The software forks identify the predominance of Bitcoin source
code in over two thirds of the coins. The similarity of bootstrap-
ping methods in the software forks of Bitcoin can be traced to the
chainparams.cpp file, seen in Table 6 in Appendix B. The source
code reveals that Bitcoin elects to use DNS seeding as the primary
bootstrapping method and we see that the core developers of the
software forks of Bitcoin merely inherit the legacy bootstrapping
mechanisms as an oversight rather than an explicit design decision.
In Figure 6 we summarize our findings of software fork lineage.
We reflect that the software forks represent the inheritance of source
code which includes suboptimal elements such as censorship-prone
bootstrapping. The figure also illustrates any hard forks of the
25 cryptocurrencies that we research, and we refer the interested
reader to Appendix C for further details. A total of five main colour
hues exist on the diagram representing the original source code par-
ents for the cryptocurrencies: blue–Bitcoin (17), green–Bytecoin (3),
orange–Verge (2), brown–Ethereum Classic (2), and yellow–Siacoin
(1), where the number in the brackets indicates the number of
coins having the same source code lineage. With the exception of
Verge, the other four source code parents use legacy bootstrapping
methods. Also, the cryptocurrencies Litecoin, Monero, Zcoin, and
Zcash have two shades to indicate that they are both software fork
children and software fork parents.
To the best of our knowledge, through our measurement study
we provide the first insight into the lack of variance in cryptocur-
rency source code. As well as inheriting bootstrapping methods we
note that any other vulnerability disclosure may materially impact
coins beyond the individual cryptocurrency being researched.
7 IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS
In this section we explore the security and social implications of our
findings which are specific to cryptocurrencies and are new with
respect to previous measurement and censorship studies [15, 58].
In contrast to the outcomes of censoring file sharing networks,
which mainly share digital music and videos, we highlight that the
consequences of censoring cryptocurrencies are more profound.
2009 BTC†
2010
2011 LTC
2012 BCN†
2013 DOGE MONA
2014 DGB VTC DASH XMR† XVG⋆ XZC
2015 SC† ETC†
2016 ETH SYS KMD ZEC ZCL
2017 BTX HSR SMRT BCH CNX† BTG ETN
1st genesis
block in year
last genesis
block in year
BTC Hard Fork ETC Hard Fork BTC Code Fork LTC Code Fork
ZEC Code Fork XZC Code Fork BCN Code Fork XMR Code Fork
ETC Code Fork Verge Code Fork
Figure 6: Cryptocurrency Hard Forks and Software Forks.
†= configured censorship-prone bootstrapping explicitly, ⋆
= configured censorship-mitigated bootstrapping explicitly,
no symbol = inherited bootstrapping method.
7.1 Security Implications of Findings
Based on the results of our measurement study we summarize the
security implications discussed throughout the paper. Whilst there
already are other Internet measurement and censorship studies, our
work is the first to focus on the simultaneous measurement of a
large group of cryptocurrencies.
We have highlighted that 95% of cryptocurrencies surveyed use
DNS seeding and/or IP hard-coding as methods to bootstrap. There-
fore, basic methods of censorship, such as DNS sinkholing or IP
blacklisting are effective at preventing peer connectivity to cryp-
tocurrency networks. With regards to DNS seeding, we see that
four cryptocurrencies return less than 26 distinct IPs, highlighting
the use of rendezvous servers for peer connectivity. With this in
mind, the high degree of peer bootstrap centralization leaves these
currencies more susceptible to outages and censorship.
Conversely, we see that ten cryptocurrencies return sets of hun-
dreds or even thousands of peer IPs in their DNS query responses,
thus revealing an unintended side-channel to harvest information
about cryptocurrency peers. The ability to harvest cryptocurrency
peer IPs via DNS query responses brings an interesting considera-
tion concerning personal data protection laws, such as the Euro-
pean Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). GDPR
applies to the processing of personal data of individuals within the
EU. According to the regulation, if information is provided which
enables the identity of an individual behind an IP then it is consid-
ered personal data [1]. It is possible to combine the data from time
stamped DNS query responses with ISP logs to potentially identify
individuals, or groups of individuals using the IP recorded.
Additionally, 32% of cryptocurrencies do not use redundant DNS
providers for their DNS seeds, leaving themselves exposed to a
single point of DNS service failure. Furthermore, evidence of DNS
manipulation is seen due to the lack of DNSSEC on any of the
cryptocurrencies surveyed. This could lead to peers in countries
where cryptocurrencies are illegal being identified through the
use of a reconnaissance host IP injected into the DNS query re-
sponse. Additionally, due to the churn associated with peer-to-peer
networks, TTL manipulation could constrain peer connection due
to stale records being cached at ISP DNS servers. Also, 88% of the
cryptocurrencies surveyed use distinctive destination ports, leaving
them open to basic port-based censorship.
Our study has also revealed that bootstrapping via Tor and ZMap
scanning are not always feasible alternatives to ‘vanilla’ options.
This highlights that a defence-in-depth approach to cryptocurrency
bootstrapping should be applied. Finally, we reveal the lack of
variance in cryptocurrency source code leaves a cascading impact
for vulnerability disclosure for coins and tokens that share the
same parent source code fork. We discuss both tactical and strategic
recommendations to these security implications in Section 8.
7.2 Social Implications of Censorship
In this section we highlight the potentially profound social impacts
of cryptocurrency censorship with two examples.
7.2.1 Limitation to Anonymous Funding Streams. Cryptocurrencies
are used as anonymous funding streams for various organizations
and individuals.
Firstly, we note that Bitcoin donations are a funding stream for
the whistleblowing organization WikiLeaks, as well as the inves-
tigative reporting platform the Organised Crime and Corruption
Reporting Project [11, 13]. Cryptocurrencies are also used to anony-
mously fund political dissidents such as Alexei Navalny, an open
critic of Vladimir Putin. Since 2016, Navalny has received anony-
mous donations totalling 591 BTC, representing approximately
3 million USD [21]. The Tor project also accepts cryptocurrency
donations to support their anonymous browsing software [14].
The motivation to censor cryptocurrencies is also considered
to limit the ability to anonymously fund terrorist organizations
such as Al-Qassam Brigades and Daesh, and also to disrupt money
laundering activities [17, 22, 53, 56]1.
If access to cryptocurrencies was censored, the funding streams
to these entities would be disrupted. Hindering funding to inves-
tigative journalism, whistleblowing, and anonymity projects like
Tor could limit the freedom of the press, thus undermining a key
aspect of modern democracy. Furthermore, if political opponents
to current governments have their funding streams limited, this un-
dermines the democratic element of fair representation for political
beliefs. In contrast, censoring cryptocurrencies may also mitigate
terrorist funding sources, and help disrupt money laundering activ-
ities. Therefore, the act of censoring these digital assets requires
consideration because the consequences of regulation have a more
significant impact to democratic ideals than the censorship of file
sharing services.
1Al-Qassam Brigades is considered a terrorist group by the USA, EU, New Zealand,
Australia, and the UK.
7.2.2 Disrupting Fiat Currency Relief. In Venezuela, cryptocurren-
cies like Bitcoin provide an option for asset ‘escape value’ where the
local currency is under threat from hyperinflation due to civil unrest
[46]. Where government banking systems are prone to collapse,
cryptocurrencies provide a conduit of asset transfer protecting
citizens from eroding currency values. Censoring access to cryp-
tocurrencies would undermine the ability for citizens to escape the
impacts of hyperinflation.
8 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this section, we provide both tactical and strategic recommenda-
tions to improve bootstrapping functionality based on our findings
and conclude our paper.
8.1 Tactical Recommendations
Tactical recommendations unfortunately assume the continued
use of censorship-prone bootstrapping methods. However, they
mitigate obvious design issues until strategic changes can be im-
plemented.
Firstly, the current code bases should be reviewed for any in-
correct configurations. We see examples of hard-coded IPs being
invalid and unreachable. We also see a lack of diversity in bootstrap-
ping methods. Therefore, the status of hard-coded seeds should be
periodically updated, and diverse bootstrapping options should be
configured to prevent a single form of censorship limiting access.
The third tactical recommendation we make targets the cryp-
tocurrencies that return a small static set of IP addresses to ren-
dezvous servers rather than returning a large dynamic set of peer
IPs. We suggest core developers consider returning peer IPs in DNS
query responses rather than the IPs of centralized servers. This
recommendation requires consideration as it limits centralization;
however it introduces a side-channel to harvest peer IPs.
The fourth recommendation is to ensure that DNS seeding or IP
hard-coding is never persistently used post-bootstrapping for peer
reconnection. Peer caching should be used to limit the ongoing re-
quirement onDNS for reconnection. Our final recommendation is to
ensure that DNS seeds are diversified to at least two DNS providers
to mitigate any outages that may occur to a single provider.
8.2 Strategic Recommendations
Strategic recommendations have overheads for implementation,
performance, and protocol complexity. However, used in combina-
tion, they offer robust mitigations to the unwanted consequences
of censorship-prone bootstrapping methods. We suggest these rec-
ommendations be included, not as default options, but as easily
configurable fallback methods.
Our first strategic recommendation covers the use of DNS seed-
ing as a bootstrapping option. Unfortunately, this recommendation
still depends on DNS seeding, but addresses its shortcomings. DNS
over TLS (DoT)/DNS over HTTPS (DoH), and DNSSEC provide
channel encryption and query response integrity respectively. DoH
has the added advantage of mitigating the identification of peer-
to-peer bootstrapping traffic, as it runs on TCP port 443. DNSSEC
would address the DNS manipulation that we see in Section 5. DoT
or DoH would also ensure that the traffic was TCP based, thus
removing the risk of UDP based DNS leakage when using Tor. How-
ever, this recommendation poses a large computational overhead
to protocol operations due to the requirement to cryptographically
sign a large dynamic set of IPs when using DNSSEC.
Our second recommendation would be creating GUI-based op-
tions for Tor bootstrapping, similar to what Zcoin offers, and also
offer Tor pluggable transport connectivity. This would allow peers
the option to have obfuscated access to cryptocurrency peer-to-
peer networks. We saw in Section 4.3 that Tor bootstrapping can be
a realistic method for connection, but the technical configuration
required may make this option prohibitive for several users. As part
of this recommendation we also suggest that Tor hidden service
.onion addresses be offered for initial connectivity.
In conclusion, we note that in isolation, none of the tactical and
strategic recommendations is able to provide a full remedy to the
censorship challenges inherent in peer-to-peer bootstrapping and
address the social and security implications they cause. However,
we know from numerous measurement studies of Internet cen-
sorship techniques that the methods employed to block specific
categories of traffic are not always effective [15, 58]. Therefore,
our measurement study has highlighted that by offering multi-
ple options for bootstrapping, a defence-in-depth approach can be
adopted, thus providing resilience for this element of cryptocur-
rency peer-to-peer functionality. Furthermore, we are optimistic
that by displaying the extent of source code inheritance further
research will consider this finding when exploring other cryptocur-
rency vulnerabilities and risk exposure.
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A SUPPORT CASES
For Section 4.3 we raise several support cases when we experience
connectivity issues when attempting to bootstrap via Tor. Not all
support cases have responses, but we are committed to working
with support and core development teams regarding our results. The
details of the support cases are: Bitcoin Gold has issue 350 opened
on GitHub August 29, 2018, Zcash support is emailed on August 23,
2018, Bytecoin support is emailed September 6, 2018, Dogecoin has
issue 1147 opened on GitHub August 29, 2018, and Electroneum has
case CS-9094 currently in progress which is opened September 6,
2018. The only support case we managed to get a response on was
with Electroneum, and the results of our work with their support
team are still pending. Also, in Section 4.3 we note that Bitcoin Cash
had a quoted blockchain download time of one year and 27 weeks
after running the download for 24 hours. To provide context to the
quoted download time, we note that the download is performed
in our lab which has a tested download speed of 225 Mbps and
upload speed of 145 Mbps when not running via a SOCKS proxy
and reduces to 5Mbps download and 3Mbps upload when running
via Tor. Also, our ZMap bootstrapping tests were done in May 2019
from a different lab with 35 Mbps download and 12 Mbps upload
speeds. Finally, in Appendix C our research regarding Komodo and
its use of the Bitcoin Merkle Root is confirmed on support case
10714 which is raised on their online ticketing system on August
31, 2018.
B TABLES
This section provides four tables that cover the details of our re-
search. In Table 4 we provide information about the tooling used to
complete our research. Also, in Table 5 we show the top 100 cryp-
tocurrencies we exported in our selection process. Table 6 provides
the SHA256 hash of each cryptocurrency’s core reference client
executable. Table 6 also provides links to the relevant source code
covering the method of bootstrapping for each cryptocurrency and
details of the TCP and UDP ports used by the peer-to-peer software.
In Table 7 we enumerate all of the DNS seeds determined from our
research and provide information about the DNS return codes for
each seed.
Table 4: Tooling Used for Research.We note that the version
given for RIPE Atlas is based on the authors personal RIPE
Atlas probe firmware version. †indicates Ubuntu’s Uncom-
plicated Firewall on version 16.04 of the OS. ‡indicates Win-
dows Defender Firewall on version 10 of the OS. The term
‘core ref.’ is shorthand for core reference client software.
Tooling Category Version Usage
Baretail logfile viewer 3.50a viewing debug / connection logs
Notepad++ text editor 7.5.8 development, log file viewing
MySQL relational database 5.7.23 processing RIPE Atlas JSON data
Python programming language 3.5.2 processing RIPE Atlas JSON data
RIPE Atlas measurement platform 4940 collect DNS response data
TCPView network activity monitor 3.05 view peer-to-peer connections
Tor SOCKS proxy server 0.3.3.7 testing Tor bootstrapping
UFW† software firewall 16.04 test censorship of each core ref.
WDF‡ software firewall 10 test censorship of each core ref.
Wireshark network traffic debugger 2.6.2 debug network traffic of core ref.
Table 5: Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitaliza-
tion. Symbols: * = tokens transitioning to native ‘main-
net’ blockchains †= Omni token ‡= NEO token unmarked
tokens = ERC20 tokens ⋆ = mineable ERC20 token for
illustration.[9].
non-mineable mineable
co
in
s
Ripple, NEO, Cardano, Stellar, IOTA, NEM,
Qtum, Lisk, Nano, Steem, Stratis, Waves, Bit-
Shares, Decred, Ardor, Ark, PIVX, Factom,
Byteball Bytes, ReddCoin, GXShares, Neblio,
Nxt, Particl, Blocknet
Bitcoin, Ethereum, Bitcoin Cash, Litecoin,
Dash, Monero, Ethereum Classic, Bitcoin
Gold, Zcash, Bytecoin, Verge, Dogecoin, Sia-
coin, Electroneum, HShare, Zclassic, Ko-
modo, Syscoin, Digibyte, Cryptonex, Mona-
coin, Bitcore, Zcoin, Vertcoin, SmartCash
to
ke
ns
EOS*, TRON*, VeChain*, Tether†, OmiseGO,
ICON*, DigixDAO, Binance Coin, Popu-
lous, RChain, Maker, Status, Aeternity, Wal-
tonchain, Augur, 0x, Veritaseum, Revain,
Gas‡, KuCoin Shares, Basic Attention To-
ken, Bytom, Zilliqa, Ethos, Loopring, Drag-
onchain, Golem, Nubulas, QASH, aelf, Poly-
math, Aion, Dent, Kyber Network, Chain-
Link, Dentacoin, IOStoken, FunFair, SALT,
Kin, Power Ledger, Bancor, Enigma, Pillar,
Request Network, Cindicator, MaidSafeCoin,
TenX, Quantstamp, SinularityNET
0xBitcoin⋆
Table 6: Cryptocurrency Executable SHA256 Hashes, Code Repositories, Destination Ports and Relevant Lines of Code. In the
Executable column, the name is represented in a case sensitive manner exactly as the installations are completed. We do not
change the names to ensure that the SHA256 hashes are correct. Symbol: */ = shorthand to represent https://github.com/.
Cryptocurrency Executable Version SHA256 Hash and Open Source Codebase (https://github.com/) Firewall Dest. Ports and Code Lines
Bitcoin Bitcoin-qt 0.16.2
23A3C2FD4C33EC5E4391E7E966CE1FCCA5EF374C5932DA352D9FC418468D6CEA
DNS Seed */Bitcoin/Bitcoin/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp
Hard-Coded */Bitcoin/Bitcoin/blob/master/contrib/seeds/nodes_main.txt
TCP: 8333, 9051
127–138
1–1525
Eth. Classic geth 5.5.1
F2FB63CFE81104F05CC3DBF42AA1FD0FA3AC0455362FD1E22519AEBF6847BCF3
Hard-Coded */ethereumproject/go-ethereum/wiki/Connecting-to-the-network
TCP/UDP: 8545, 30301-30307
N/A
Bitcoin Gold Bitcoin-qt 0.15.1
0EE01DB46D71A8C19B1540DA50D28D29C3CDD03899BFCFF79860E175C58CC6B3
DNS Seed */BTCGPU/BTCGPU/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp
TCP: 8338
174–193
ZCash zcld 1.1.2
1636240D9781C9AA1AB143BD4CA93F09F4F5610A6D1DC7A33D8513A9954F9073
DNS Seed */zcash/zcash/blob/8df0....6243/src/chainparams.cpp
TCP: 8233
137–141
Bytecoin bytecoind 3.2.2
A3460AA6F536B0D8C1A8BB98C51592D44A5294B97C89A7ED17BBC22D8E0B4045
Hard-Coded */bcndev/bytecoin/blob/master/src/CryptoNoteConfig.hpp
TCP: 8080
125–126
Verge VERGE-qt 4.0.2.0
5EEFA37A574A4D36A0B5656A11297ED4A42FEFB80D3BF2B53079DC3A581402D3
Tor */vergecurrency/VERGE/blob/master/src/net.cpp
TCP: 9050–Tor
1046–1059
Dogecoin dogecoin-qt 1.10.0
D7050A58A53522AF8AA176262F24378B7F7B7330A2D697C0AFFF0A65244555B2
DNS Seed */dogecoin/dogecoin/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp
TCP: 22556
123–126
Siacoin siad 1.3.3
DB37321482B0E2BB6161F42C95C245A5DB541EFD1EDB5B0EED261A50A3914625
Hard-Coded */NebulousLabs/Sia/blob/fa3e....4366/modules/gateway.go
TCP/UDP: 9981, 9982
15–129
Electroneum electroneumd 2.1.0.0
32AE2E24DF7265D3EF87067959E71B53371B00842773C6AE8B1ABDF090D862A1
DNS Seed */electroneum/electroneum/blob/master/src/p2p/net_node.h
Hard-Coded */electroneum/electroneum/blob/master/src/p2p/net_node.inl
TCP: 3333, 5555, 7777
134–136
407–430
HShare hshare-qt 2.1.0.0
4C26861E991FF492E2430D2D7C6BCD0788E30D3ECD04587DBEB73F3BED7F3E00
DNS Seed */HcashOrg/Hshare/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp
Hard-Coded */HcashOrg/Hshare/blob/master/share/seeds/nodes_main.txt
TCP: 7433, 11616
115–117
388–420
Zclassic zcld 1.0.10
A36CF337560EBF096233F55335045982BD81F8E7A47B490B8B9C200840E7975E
DNS Seed */z-classic/zclassic/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp
Hard-Coded */z-classic/zclassic/blob/master/contrib/seeds/nodes_main.txt
TCP: 8133
100–114
1–4
Komodo komodod 1.0.15
6D48EFFB8172FD3C308A9D5268FF8A29C1DE47EE38531AD5C1585AE83684A231
DNS Seed */KomodoPlatform/komodo/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp
Hard-Coded */KomodoPlatform/KomodoPlatform/blob/master/iguana/dpow/dpow_network.c
TCP: 7771, 7778
163–167
25–39
Syscoin syscoin-qt 3.0.6.2
6C42EE3412311106C6618744AE4A351B69B72CBACD126149A6BC88D169EA0DFB
DNS Seed */syscoin/syscoin/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp
TCP: 8001, 8369
242–245
Digibyte digibyte-qt 6.16.2
D640973832EDFDC1E41FEF9DB64612ED559C5CF6F6559624D7C7C4A5BC2DC950
DNS Seed */digibyte/digibyte/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp
Hard-Coded */digibyte/digibyte/blob/master/src/chainparamsseeds.h
TCP: 9051, 12024
207–214
1–59
Cryptonex cryptonex-qt 1.0.0.0
8B5670006E4FB395CC17DC396875CCCB360AF850CA54FFF52B1C0E625C3819E6
DNS Seed */Cryptonex/source/blob/9a76....ae10/src/net.cpp
TCP: 20863
1227–1239
Monacoin monacoin-qt 0.15.1
637DA8B48EB23E84DE5C48CBBA823A8D5322B8066C6F2A5C05F0D3A9C6DD6DFA
DNS Seed */monacoinproject/monacoin/blob/master-0.15/src/chainparams.cpp
Hard-Coded */monacoinproject/monacoin/blob/01c6....b504/src/chainparamsseeds.h
TCP: 9401
236–239
1–27
Bitcore bitcore-qt 0.15.1.0
271A265C61B7F38A66C4C2D578BA760BD6B87F9E1FE107C81494340479787A8C
Hard-Coded */LIMXTEC/BitCore/blob/0.15/src/chainparams.cpp
TCP: 8555
134–138
Zcoin zcoin-qt 0.13.6.6
69E350F52D83CC59ECD9820793D546332A3160B8C509AF428BF5241863B2E507
DNS Seed */zcoinofficial/zcoin/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp
Hard-Coded */zcoinofficial/zcoin/blob/master/contrib/seeds/nodes_main.txt
TCP: 8168, 8888, 18168, 18888
169–173
1–9
Vertcoin vertcoin-qt 0.13.2
73C695F8C417097827C2B8121751FE9DF61E0D88CE40EDBE0636739077ACA016
DNS Seed */vertcoin-project/vertcoin-core/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp
Hard-Coded */vertcoin-project/vertcoin-core/blob/master/src/chainparamsseeds.h
TCP: 8333, 5889, 60021, 6970
127–133
1–36
SmartCash smartcash-qt 1.2.4
867A940D767E239DB2C937B3478C1F7A95E6D1A72C4D946831C9102850761BEA
DNS Seed */SmartCash/Core-Smart/blob/032d....3df1/src/chainparams.cpp
Hard-Coded */SmartCash/Core-Smart/blob/e0fe....6429/contrib/seeds/nodes_main.txt
TCP: 8333, 5889, 60021, 6970
148–157
1–10
Table 7: 92 DNS Seeds from source code. RCODES: 0 NOERROR, 1 SERVFAIL, and 3 NXDOMAIN. Symbols †= measurements
started August 2018, unmarked = measurements started May 2018, ⋆ = resolves IPv4 and IPv6,  = part of RIPE Atlas data
collection as majority of probes return NOERROR, ∗ = RCODE in May 2018 different in August 2018.  Yes # No G# Partial.
Cryptocurrency DNS Seed R:0 R:1 R:3 Cryptocurrency DNS Seed R:0 R:1 R:3
Bitcoin seed.bitcoin.sipa.be⋆  # # Zclassic† as1/2/3.zclassic.org  # #
Bitcoin dnsseed.bluematt.me⋆  # # Zclassic† as2.zclassic.org  # #
Bitcoin dnsseed.bitcoin.dashjr.org⋆  # # Zclassic† as3.zclassic.org  # #
Bitcoin seed.bitcoinstats.com⋆  # # Komodo† seeds.komodoplatform.com  # #
Bitcoin seed.bitcoin.jonasschnelli.ch⋆  # # Komodo† static.kolo.supernet.org  # #
Bitcoin seed.btc.petertodd.org G#✓ G# # Komodo† dynamic.kolo.supernet.org  # #
Bitcoin seed.bitcoin.sprovoost.nl⋆  # # Syscoin seed1.syscoin.org  # #
Bitcoin Cash seed.bitcoinabc.org #  ∗ # Syscoin seed2.syscoin.org  # #
Bitcoin Cash seed-abc.bitcoinforks.org⋆ G#✓ G# # Syscoin seed3.syscoin.org G#✓ G# #
Bitcoin Cash btccash-seeder.bitcoinunlimited.info⋆  # # Syscoin seed4.syscoin.org G#✓ G# #
Bitcoin Cash seed.bitprim.org  # # Digibyte seed1.digibyte.io  # #
Bitcoin Cash seed.deadalnix.me⋆  # # Digibyte seed2.digibyte.io  # #
Bitcoin Cash seeder.criptolayer.net G# G# # Digibyte seed3.digibyte.io  # #
Litecoin seed-a.litecoin.loshan.co.uk⋆ G#✓ G# # Digibyte seed.digibyte.io  # #
Litecoin dnsseed.thrasher.io  # # Digibyte digihash.co  # #
Litecoin dnsseed.litecointools.com  # # Digibyte digiexplorer.info⋆  # #
Litecoin dnsseed.litecoinpool.org⋆  # # Digibyte seed.digibyteprojects.com  # #
Litecoin dnsseed.koin-project.com  # # Cryptonex node-london.cryptonex.org  # #
Dash dnsseed.dash.org G#✓ G# # Cryptonex node-frankfurt.cryptonex.org  # #
Dash dnsseed.dashdot.io⋆  # # Cryptonex node-amsterdam.cryptonex.org  # #
Dash dnsseed.masternode.io⋆  # # Cryptonex node-toronto.cryptonex.org  # #
Dash dnsseed.dashpay.io G# # G# Cryptonex node-singapore.cryptonex.org G#∗ # G#∗
Monero seeds.moneroseeds.ch G# # G# Cryptonex node-paris.cryptonex.org  # #
Monero seeds.moneroseeds.li G# # G# Cryptonex node-bangalore.cryptonex.org  # #
Monero seeds.moneroseeds.ae.org G# # G# Monacoin dnsseed.monacoin.org  # #
Monero seeds.moneroseeds.se G# # G# Zcoin sf1.zcoin.io  # #
Bitcoin Gold eu-dnsseed.bitcoingold-official.org # #  Zcoin sf2.zcoin.io  # #
Bitcoin Gold dnsseed.bitcoingold.org⋆  # # Zcoin london.zcoin.io  # #
Bitcoin Gold dnsseed.btcgpu.org⋆  # # Zcoin singapore.zcoin.io  # #
Zcash† dnsseed.z.cash  # # Zcoin nyc.zcoin.io  # #
Zcash† dnsseed.str4d.xyz⋆  # # Vertcoin useast1.vtconline.org∗ #  #
Zcash† dnsseed.znodes.org⋆  # # Vertcoin vtc.gertjaap.org∗ #  #
Dogecoin seed.dogecoin.com #  # Vertcoin seed.vtc.bryangoodson.org #  #
Dogecoin seed.multidoge.org  # # Vertcoin dnsseed.pknight.ca  # #
Dogecoin seed2.multidoge.org⋆  # # Vertcoin seed.orderofthetaco.org∗ #  #
Dogecoin seed.doger.dogecoin.com #  # Vertcoin seed.alexturek.org∗ #  #
Electroneum seeds.electroneum.com # #  Vertcoin vertcoin.mbl.cash  # #
HShare† hshare-dns1.h.cash G# # G# SmartCash seed.smrt.cash  # #
HShare† hshare-dns2.h.cash G# # G# SmartCash seed1.smrt.cash  # #
HShare† hshare-dns3.h.cash G# # G# SmartCash seed2.smrt.cash  # #
Zclassic† na1.zclassic.org  # # SmartCash seed1.smartcash.org G# # G#∗
Zclassic† na2.zclassic.org  # # SmartCash seed2.smartcash.org G# # G#∗
Zclassic† na3.zclassic.org  # # SmartCash seed.smartcash.cc  # #
Zclassic† eu1.zclassic.org  # # SmartCash seed2.smartcash.cc  # #
Zclassic† eu2.zclassic.org  # # SmartCash seed3.smartcash.cc  # #
Zclassic† eu3.zclassic.org  # # SmartCash seed4.smartcash.cc  # #
C SOFTWARE FORKS AND HARD FORKS
We provide further details about the hard forks and software forks
noted in Figure 6. A description of Genesis Blocks and Merkle Roots
is given to understand the nature of cryptocurrency hard forks and
how they differ from software forks. We recall that mapping the
Bitcoin
assert(consensus.hashGenesisBlock == uint256S
("0x000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f"));
assert(genesis.hashMerkleRoot == uint256S
("0x4a5e1e4baab89f3a32518a88c31bc87f618f76673e2cc77ab2127b7afdeda33b"));
Bitcoin Cash
assert(consensus.hashGenesisBlock == uint256S
("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f"));
assert(genesis.hashMerkleRoot == uint256S
("4a5e1e4baab89f3a32518a88c31bc87f618f76673e2cc77ab2127b7afdeda33b"));
Komodo
assert(consensus.hashGenesisBlock == uint256S
("0x027e3758c3a65b12aa1046462b486d0a63bfa1beae327897f56c5cfb7daaae71"));
assert(genesis.hashMerkleRoot == uint256S
("0x4a5e1e4baab89f3a32518a88c31bc87f618f76673e2cc77ab2127b7afdeda33b"));
Figure 7: Genesis Blocks and Merkle Roots of Bitcoin, Bit-
coin Cash and Komodo.
software forks on the cryptocurrencies allows us to highlight the
lack of variance between the underlying source code. This allows
other security researchers to expand the scope of vulnerability
disclosure for individual cryptocurrencies which share a source
code base with other coins. Hard forks of cryptocurrencies occur
when a blockchain permanently diverges into two separate chains
at a particular block number. Cryptocurrencies which are hard
forks of a parent cryptocurrency must have the same Genesis Block
which includes the initial Merkle Root of the parent [19]. The latter
is a strict cryptographic requirement which ultimately relates to
the inception point of the blockchain construction. We note that
software forks have no strict requirements for cryptographic im-
mutability. Instead, they are simply source code repository forks,
most commonly seen on the GitHub platform. For a discussion on
the different types of forks, please refer to [3].
C.1 Komodos Genesis Block and Merkle Root
Interestingly, we see that although Komodo is a software fork of
Zcash, it seems to have created its Genesis Block prior to Zcash, and
it is the only coin to have the property of front running its parent
in this manner. In fact, Komodo has another interesting property
not captured by Figure 6. Komodo opted to use the initial Merkle
Root that Bitcoin used. A blockchain explorer actually indicates
that because the initial Merkle Root for Komodos Genesis Block
was Bitcoins, the timestamp is recorded as 2009-01-03. Therefore,
we counted the subsequent block in the blockchain as its Genesis
Block, which occurred on 2016-09-13. In Figure 7 we provide an
extract from the chainparams.cpp files hosted onGitHub for Bitcoin,
Bitcoin Cash and Komodo. We see that Bitcoin Cash is a hard fork
of Bitcoin because the Genesis Block and Merkle Root are identical.
However, we see that Komodo is not a hard fork of Bitcoin because
only the Merkle Root is the same. The Bitcoin Genesis Block is made
up from the double iterated SHA256 hash output of the original
Merkle Root 0x4a5e1e4b...afdeda33b but is also concatenated with
other fields such as the timestamp, nonce, and version. So, although
Komodo shares the same Merkle Root as Bitcoin it does not share
the same Genesis Block because the latter mentioned fields are
not the same as those used by Bitcoin. Therefore, it is clear from
the properties of hashing functions that when the different fields
are concatenated onto the Bitcoin Merkle Root that the resulting
Genesis Block for Komodo outputs a different hash value to Bitcoin.
